



# **Seabasing Capabilities Based Assessment**

## **EXPEDITIONARY WARRIOR '08 IPC Briefing**

**J-8 Studies, Analysis, and Gaming Division (SAGD)**

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**OVERALL CLASSIFICATION:  
UNCLASSIFIED (U)**

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## *Overview (U)*


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- (U) Purpose
  - (U) Seabasing background and recommended way ahead
  - (U) Capabilities Based Assessment (CBA) scope
  - (U) Functional Needs Analysis (FNA) gaps
  - (U) Joint Capabilities Document (JCD) key points
  - (U) Proposed Functional Solutions Analyses (FSAs) and sponsors
  - (U) Joint Seabasing Analysis and Wargaming (JSAW)
  - (U) Major programs expected to contribute to Joint Seabasing

## *Purpose (U)*



- (U) To summarize the Seabasing Joint Capabilities Document (JCD) and Joint Seabasing Analysis and Wargaming (JSAW) way ahead
- (U) To consolidate visions of the Joint Seabasing Concept

# Seabasing Background and Recommended Way Ahead (U)



★ (U) Initiate a Joint Seabasing Analysis and Wargaming (JSAW) study to inform the FSA process by scoping the 17 capability gaps identified in the FNA

★ (U) Assign sponsors for three of the four FSAs derived from the 17 FNA gaps:

- Operational Speed – JFCOM
- Seabasing Persistence – USN
- Global Access – USN
- *Net Centric / C2 – Similar FSAs currently being conducted by multiple CBAs*

## Recommended Way Ahead

- (U) JROC approve the JCD in order to progress to the FSA phase
- (U) JROC direct the JSAW in order to analytically inform and refine the FSAs
- (U) JROC approve FSA sponsors in order to enhance synchronization between JSAW and FSAs
- (U) J-8 SAGD update JROC regarding JSAW lead and resource strategy


## *Seabasing Concept, Scope, and Assumptions (U)*



- (U) Seabasing is a concept integrating Joint capabilities in order to provide a scalable, national strategic capability to close, assemble, employ, sustain, and reconstitute Joint combat forces from the sea.
- (U) 2015-2025 timeframe
- (U) Assumptions:
  - (U) Lack of assured access to land bases
  - (U) Increased requirement for forward deployed forces
  - (U) Asymmetric, multi-dimensional force protection challenges
  - (U) Greater operational flexibility / maneuver space
  - (U) Analysis based on supporting two brigade-sized combat units

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## *Concept of Operations Summary (U)*



## *FNA Prioritized Seabasing Capabilities (U)*

	(U) Capability Description
1	(U) Provide continuous support and sustainment without reliance on land bases w/in the JOA.
2	(U) Provide overseas presence through forward deployed forces and/or pre-positioned materiel.
3	(U) Provide increased speed of force closure from strategic distances to the JOA.
4	(U) Provide net-centric, collaborative environment that enables dynamic, mobile, distributed, units and platforms to operate from a sea base.
5	(U) Provide and integrate persistent joint logistics to sustain expeditionary joint force operations.
6	(U) Provide on-scene and rapidly deployable C2 and ISR systems that are interoperable with joint and select multi-national systems, scalable to mission requirements.
7	(U) Provide ability to rapidly receive, assemble, transfer and/or cross-deck joint forces (personnel and equipment) and/or sustainment, and tailor joint force packages at sea.
8	(U) Enable immediate integration of follow-on movement and sustainment of personnel, equipment and supplies.
9	(U) Provide the joint force a base at sea and a complement to existing global basing strategy.
10	(U) Conduct simultaneous offensive operations against multi-dimensional threats (conventional as well as irregular).
11	(U) Provide ISR to joint forces operating in the JOA.
12	(U) Provide simultaneous force flows to include forcible entry operations by air and sea across multiple entry points.
13	(U) Ability for joint forces to rapidly move to/from a sea base.
14	(U) Provide ability to maneuver and sustain joint forces from the sea base to inland objectives at operational depths from OTH by a combination of air and surface means to include over the shore, shallow water and austere access.
15	(U) Access and integrate relevant intelligence activities (including adversary capabilities, disposition and intention) to support joint operations.

**(U) COCOM and FCB survey produced capability prioritization**

# Capability Gaps (U)

## (U) 17 Capability Gaps

**FNA Analysis of  
15 Required Capabilities**

Joint Capability Area Gaps	FCB Responsibilities							
	JT	FM	FP	FA	BA	C2	NC	FL
<b>Joint Access and Access Denial Operations (Tier 1)</b>								
Gap 01: Seabasing (Tier 2)		S	S	P				
Gap 02: Seabasing (Tier 2)		S	S	P				S
Gap 03: Forcible Entry (Tier 2)			S	P	S			S
<b>Joint Land Operations (Tier 1)</b>								
Gap 04: Conduct Operational Movement and Maneuver (Tier 2)			S	P	S			
<b>Joint Maritime / Littoral Operations (Tier 1)</b>								
Gap 05: Maritime / Littoral Fires (Tier 2)			S	P	S			
<b>Joint Protection (Tier 1)</b>								
Gap 06: Conventional Weapons Threat (Tier 2)			P	S	S			
Gap 07: Personnel Recovery (Tier 2)			P	S	S			
<b>Joint Net-Centric Operations (Tier 1)</b>								
Gap 08: Information Transport (Tier 2)				S			P	S
Gap 09: Enterprise Services (Tier 2)							P	S
<b>Joint Logistics (Tier 1)</b>								
Gap 10: Joint Deployment / Rapid Distribution (Tier 2)				S				P
Gap 11: Agile Sustainment (Tier 2)				S				P
Gap 12: Force Health Protection (Tier 2)			S	S				P
Gap 13: Logistics Information Fusion (Tier 2)				S			S	P
<b>Joint Battlespace Awareness (Tier 1)</b>								
Gap 14: Develop Shared Situational Awareness & Understanding (Tier 2)			S	S	P	S	S	S
<b>Joint Command &amp; Control (Tier 1)</b>								
Gap 15: Plan Collaboratively (Tier 2)		S				P		S
Gap 16: Synchronize Execution Across All Domains (Tier 2)	S	S	S	S		P		S
Gap 17: Leverage Mission Partners (Tier 2)	S	S				P	S	S

**P** =Primary

**S** =Supporting

**(U) FNA analysis produced 17 capability gaps aligned under 8 Tier 1 and 16 Tier 2 JCAs**



## *Gap 3: Forcible Entry (U)*



**(U) Gap #3: Forcible Entry– *The joint sea base currently has limited capability to conduct a military operation from over the horizon in the face of expected armed opposition to gain entry of ground forces in order to project combat power to inland objectives at operational depth.***

**1. (U) Tier 1 JCA: Joint Access and Access Denial Operations**

**1. (U) Tier 2 JCA: Forcible Entry**

**2. (U) Applicable FAA Tasks (UJTLs):**

- (U) OP 1.2.4–Conduct operations in depth
- (U) OP 1.2.5–Conduct offensive operations in the JOA
- (U) OP 5.5–Establish, organize, and operate a joint force headquarters
- (U) OP 4.4–Coordinate support for forces in the JOA
- (U) OP 4.5.1–Provide for movement of services in the JOA

## Gap 3: Forcible Entry (U)


OP_1.1.2	C_5.2 Plan and conduct aerial refueling.	Provide aerial refueling support to sea based operations within (Objective 96 hours; Threshold 120 hours).	Hours—time from execution order to position scalable aerial refueling support for joint seabasing force employment operations.	96 hours	120 hours
OP_1.2.4	E_4.8 Project to operational depths (over the horizon from the sea base to inland objectives) battalion sized expeditionary task force(s) within a period of darkness (8 hrs) using vertical lift provided by sea based assets.	Conduct near simultaneous lift (within 60 minutes) of at least fifty percent (50 pct) of a task organized vertical assault battalion (per brigade) with accompanying combat support elements.	Minutes - time to lift 50% of a task organized vertical/air assault battalion (per brigade) with accompanying combat support elements.	45 minutes	60 minutes
OP_1.2.4	E_4.10 Tactical recovery of personnel and equipment and/or in-extremis hostage rescue.	Rapidly, plan, configure and launch up to company-sized task force.	Hours - time required from notification to prepare and begin movement (if required) of up to company sized special task force.	4 hours	6 hours
OP_1.2.4	E_4.8 and E_4.12 Project to operational depths (OTH from the sea base to inland objectives) expeditionary task forces within a period of darkness(8 hours) using vertical and surface lift provided by sea-based assets.	Move up to two battalions per brigade from OTH out to 25 nm (surface) and 110 nm (air) from the sea base within one period of darkness.	Hours—time required to move 100 pct of two battalions (assault echelon of a brigade) from OTH, 25 nm (surface) and 110 nm (air) from the sea base within one period of darkness.	8 hours	10 hours
OP_1.2.4	E_4.13 Project brigade-sized task forces using austere access surface craft by coordinating and synchronizing maneuver through the sea base to objectives ashore.	Employ scalable combat configured force (Bn TF(+)) through Heavy Brigade Combat Team (BCT)) from strategic distances (10,000 nm), through an austere port with minimal RSOI.	Days—time to close a heavy BCT 10,000 nm from time of departure to ready for commencement of off load at an austere port.	10 days	14 days
OP_1.2.5	E_4.13 Project brigade-sized task forces using austere access surface craft by coordinating and synchronizing maneuver through the sea base to objectives ashore	Employ scalable combat configured force (Bn TF(+)) through Heavy Brigade Combat Team (BCT)) from strategic distances (10,000 nm), through an austere port with minimal RSOI.	Days—time to close a heavy BCT 10,000 nm from time of departure to ready for commencement of off load at an austere port.	10 days	14 days
OP_1.2.4; OP_1.2.5	E_4.13 Project brigade-sized task forces using austere access surface craft by coordinating and synchronizing maneuver through the sea base to objectives ashore.	Employ scalable combat configured force (Bn TF(+)) through Heavy Brigade Combat Team (BCT)) from strategic distances (10,000 nm), through an austere port with minimal RSOI.	Hours—time to off load a heavy BCT, which equates to a rate in STONS per hour, to off load a combat force in austere port from a prime mover.	12 hours - 500 STONS per hour	24 hours - 250 STONS per hour
OP_1.2.4; OP_1.2.5	E_4.13 Project brigade-sized task forces using austere access surface craft by coordinating and synchronizing maneuver through the sea base to objectives ashore.	Employ scalable combat configured force (Bn TF(+)) through Heavy Brigade Combat Team (BCT)) from strategic distances (10,000 nm), through an austere port with minimal RSOI.	Measure - depth at austere port in feet.	15 feet	20 feet
OP_1.2.4; OP_1.2.5	E_5.1.2 Launch and recover special operating forces (SOF) from the sea base.	Support clandestine entry and recovery of platoon sized SOF forces by vertical, surface, and subsurface means.	Distance—range to conduct clandestine entry and recovery of platoon sized SOF forces from the sea base by vertical, surface, and	2000 nm	240 nm

## *Joint Capabilities Document (JCD) Key Points (U)*



- (U) Captures the results of the FNA and FAA
- (U) All critical comments from Services, COCOMs, and FCBs resolved
- (U) Organizes the 17 FNA gaps into four functional areas
  - (U) Operational Speed
  - (U) Seabasing Persistence
  - (U) Global Access
  - (U) Distributed Net Centric / C2
- (U) Recognizes the need for further analytical rigor prior to FSA due to the broad nature of the Seabasing umbrella concept, and the requirement to consolidate multiple efforts into a coherent Joint vision
- (U) Recommends JSAW to scope gaps, inform FSAs, and provide a quantitative analytical base that is defensible in acquisition phase
- (U) Recommends a Seabasing Integration Team (SIT) overseeing JSAW and FSAs to ensure Joint integration

## *JCD-Proposed FSAs and Recommended Sponsors (U)*




## *Joint Seabasing Analysis and Wargaming (JSAW) (U)*



- (U) JSAW process
  - (U) Consolidate Seabasing visions
  - (U) Refine CONOPS
  - (U) Qualitative wargaming
  - (U) Quantitative modeling and simulation
- (U) Leverage Operational Availability-08 framework and MCO-1 scenario applied to the 2015 to 2025 timeframe
- (U) Objectives
  - (U) Quantify the scope and risk of the 17 capability gaps identified in the FNA
  - (U) Focus and economize FSA efforts by eliminating redundancies
  - (U) JSAW results become JCD Appendix K
    - (U) Quantify risks associated with proceeding or not proceeding with solutions to each gap
    - (U) Prioritize gaps based on risk assessment

## Joint Seabasing Analysis and Wargaming (JSAW) Process (U)



### JSAW Objectives (U)

- (U) Quantify the scope and risk of the 17 capability gaps identified in the FNA
- (U) Focus and economize FSA efforts by eliminating redundancies
- (U) JSAW results become JCD Appendix K
- (U) Meet a performance objective of 6 months from study initiation to report

## *JSAW Analytic Objectives (U)*

- (U) Develop a wargaming and modeling and simulation (M&S) plan that:
  - (U) Informs Joint experimentation and Seabasing CONOPs
  - (U) Integrates/refines OA-08 Case 2 CONOPs
  - (U) Validates and scopes FNA capability gaps, and assesses the lines of operation
  - (U) Identifies new capability gaps
  - (U) Develops data from JIC, FNA, JCD, and OA-08 Case 2 to support wargaming and M&S
  - (U) Determines measures of effectiveness (MOEs) and measures of performance (MOPs) addressing gaps using:
    - (U) JCD identified objective and threshold values
    - (U) JCD prioritized capabilities, deficiencies, and gaps
  - (U) Produces sufficiently detailed wargaming results to inform analytic experimental designs
  - (U) Supports a Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) decision brief illustrating Seabasing's ability to mitigate risk to the warfighter prior to expending additional resources
  - (U) Informs subsequent FSA efforts



# Questions / Comments ?

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## *JSAW Strategic Study Questions (U)*



- (U) What are the components and core capabilities that will constitute a 2015 sea base in the context of a selected major combat operation (MCO) scenario?
- (U) Does “Sea Base 2015” enhance Joint combat effectiveness and mitigate risk to the warfighter in the MCO scenario?
- (U) What components and core capabilities *should* constitute a 2025 sea base in the MCO scenario?
- (U) Does “Sea Base 2025” enhance Joint combat effectiveness and mitigate risk to the warfighter considering a 2025 projected threat posture applied to the MCO scenario?

## *Major Programs Expected to Contribute to Seabasing (U)*



- (U) DoN preview
  - (U) Maritime Prepositioning Force Future
  - (U) Seabase-to-Shore Connector
  - (U) High Speed Connectors
    - (U) Joint High Speed Vessel
    - (U) Joint High Speed Sealift
  - (U) V-22
  - (U) CH-53K
  - (U) Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle
  - (U) Global Fleet Station Concept

- (U) USA preview
  - (U) Afloat Forward Staging Base
  - (U) High Speed Connectors
  - (U) Joint Heavy Lift
  - (U) Joint Logistics Over-The-Shore